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The Electoral College and the Federal Bias
CARLETON

w. STERLING

University of Notre Dame
Although most of the public believes that the President is elected
in the nation's ballot boxes every four years according to democratic
principles, the more sophisticated know that he is elected by a complex
federal mechanism that only approximates a popular election. Usually
the apparent popular vote favorite also wins an electoral college majority, and is thus elected President Actually, national popular vote
tallies have no legal standing. They are unofficial tabulations calculated
by the convention of combining the popular votes for each slate of
electors pledged to a particular presidential ticket in the various states
and (since 1964) the District of Columbia. 1 Nonpopular aspects of the
system provide biases that may affect the selection of the President,
particularly when leading candidates closely compete for the popular
votes. Political analysts, however, are divided on the cumulative effects
of these biases.
Many liberal political scientists believe that the present system
favors liberal urban and minority groups. These groups allegedly hold
the balance of power in the largest states casting large blocs of electoral
votes under the winner-take-all system that the states have adopted for
appointing electors. 2 The southern states with relatively low voter turnouts are theoretically advantaged under the present system because
states with equal populations control equal numbers of electors, whereas
under direct election, electoral strength would be cast only by voters.
On the other hand, the winner-take-all system penalized the South during its period of one-party domination. The presidential ticket carrying
the South won its electoral votes by overwhelming popular pluralities
while the opposing ticket often accumulated more electoral votes with
1 Sometimes members of the same electoral slate pledg ed to the same national
ticket may not receive precisely the same number of popular votes. In those instances,
the convention has been to attribute to a presidential ticket those votes cast for the
greatest vote-getter pledged to the ticket.
2 After the 1968 election, when there was much concern with reforming the
electoral system, Maine adopted a district system for electing its electors apportioned
for its representation based on population. Maine only has two districts and the
move was apparently to dramatize discontent with the winner-take-all system. The
district system was once popular, but was generally abandoned in favor of the
winner-take-all general ticket system by 1832. The general tick et system has been
the exclusive system employed in the states in the twentieth century.
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the same popular strength by carrying states by more modest margins
elsewhere. Other biases have convinced many observers that the small
states are advantaged by the present system and, therefore, should resist
attempts to introduce a direct popular election of the President. Although
there are flaws in all claims of special advantages for particular groups
under the electoral college system, this article will focus on the alleged
electoral advantages for the small states.
The most obvious bias favoring the small states is the two electora l
votes apportioned each state for its equal representation in the Senate
in addition to the votes apportioned for its proportional representation
in the House. These two "extra" votes for each state do enhance the electoral power of the small states as compared to a system basing apportion ment solely on population. A small state that is entitled to only one or
two U. S. Representatives on the basis of its population has its electoral
college representation at least doubled by the two votes based on representation in the Senate. If the 50 states and the District of Columbia
are considered as three blocs of equal numbers of large, intermediate,
and small states, then the 17 small states 3 would have lost half their
electoral strength in the last presidential election, if they had been
apportioned votes precisely proportional to their populations. The 17
intermediate states would have lost modestly, about five percent of their
strength, while the 17 large states would have gained about ten percent
under an apportionment precisely proportional to population. 4
Superficially, the relative enlargement of small state electoral strength
by the two "extra" votes per state would seem to indicate that the present
system does significantly magnify the electoral power of the small states
in presidential elections. 5 However, the present apportionment system
makes the small states incapable of mobilizing an electoral majority
except in combination with large states. When absolute vote strengths
are compared under the present apportionment, the 17 small states have
only 62 votes, the 17 int ermedia te states 134, and the 17 large states
3 The District of Columbia is treated as one of the smallest states for purposes
of electoral college representation.
4 These calculations were based on the 1960 census and the apportionment
according to that census. The 1970 census and subsequent reapportionment do not
alter the figures presented here.
5 Electoral power has been defined as the ability of an electoral unit to affect
electoral outcomes measured by the mathematical probability that its votes would
be decisive to an electoral majority. Theoretically, this is different than a state's
electoral vote strength. However, given the large number of possible winning coalitions of states under the present system, the electoral power of each state is almost
precisely proportional to its electoral vote strength, See: Irwin Mann and L. S.
Shl!J)ely, "The A Priori Voting Strength of the Electoral College," in Game Theory
and Related Approaches to Social Behavior, ed. Martin Shubik (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1964) , pp. 151-164.
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342.s As 270 electoral votes are necessary to elect a President, clearly
the small and intermediate states are pow erless unless allied with large
states. In fact, under the present apportionment, eleven larg e states could
control a majority of the electoral votes.
A small state may contribute more electoral votes than its population alone would warrant to coalitions favored by a popular plurality
of its voters. In 1960 and 1968, when the major-party voters were almost
evenly split nationally, Richard Nixon was able to carry a maiority of
the states against Democratic coalitions with his greater popularity outside the most populous states. In 1968 Nixon carried 32 states with 302
electoral votes, while Hubert Humphrey carried only 14 states (including
the District of Columbia) and 191 electoral votes, and George Wallace
carried five states and 45 electoral votes. 7 Indeed, had Nixon won precisely 50 percent of the two-party votes in 1968, he still would have
carried 32 states against 14 for Humphr ey. One can project the states
that Nixon would have carried with precisely half the major-party votes
nationally by assuming that a constant percentage of the major-party
votes would have shifted in each state to produce an equal national
division. This neutral assumption facilitates a demonstration of the effect
of the distribution of popular support among the states independent of
popular preference for a particular presidential ticket. Because Nixon
carried all his states by relatively more than his national popular vote
margin, no states and their electoral votes would shift to Humphrey.
Thus, with the two major parties equally dividing the nation's popular
votes, Nixon would still carry four of the nine states containing most of
the nation's population and 28 of the rest of the states. Humphr ey would
still carry five of the nine largest states and, only nine of the remaining
states. Nixon's 18-state lead over Humphrey represented a 36-vote lead
based on the states' two "extra'' votes, and Nixon built up his lead in
state victories outside the states with the most population. Nixon was
the popular vote favorite in the smaller states, carrying about 52.7 percent of the major-party votes in these states, and would hav e carried a
projected 52.3 percent with an equal division of the two-party votes.
However, with an electoral lead of 111 votes over Humphrey, Nixon
gained at least 75 additional electoral votes through biases in the system
not attributable to the two "extra" votes for each state. This was principally the result of the Republicans carrying their states by more modest
margins than the Democrats carried their states with equal popular
6 Under the previous apportionment the division was 63, 135, and 340 votes
for the small, intermediate, and large states respectively.
7 One elector chosen on a slate pledged to Nixon in North Carolina voted for
Wallace, leaving Nixon with 301 votes in the electoral college.
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support nationally. The Republican votes were so well distributed relative to the Democratic votes in 1968 that Nixon could have won an
electoral majority with a projected 49.1 percent of the major-party votes.
Assuming a constant percentage shift of major-party support to the
Democratic ticket in each state, Humphrey would have needed 51.2 percent of the major-party votes. Because this meant that Nixon could have
beaten Humphrey while trailing him by more than one million popular
votes, the projections cast doubt on the thesis that urban liberal and
minority groups in the populous states are particularly advantaged by
the present system in close elections. Humphrey's voter coalition was
essentially liberal compared to Nixon's, with particular strength in the
cities and among non-whites and non-Protestants. 8
The case for a net advantage for small state voters is also dubious.
Although trailing slightly in the national popular vote count in 1960,
Nixon still carried a majority' of the states, winning 26 states against 23
for Kennedy. 9 Nixon trailed two states to seven in the nine states containing a majority of the nation's population, but led in the rest of the
nation with 24 states against 16 for Kennedy. Although carrying only
48.9 percent of the two-party vote in the nine largest states, Nixon
carried 51.2 percent of the votes elsewhere. Projecting for an equal division of the two-party votes, only Hawaii with three electoral votes would
shift to Nixon. Nixon's proiected 27 to 22 state lead gives him only 10
electoral votes based on his ability to carry more of the votes apportioned
to states, regardless of population, because of his disproportionate
strength in the smaller states. Moreover, as Kennedy actually enjoyed
an 84 electoral vote lead over Nixon, and Kennedy would still lead by
a projected 78 votes with a precisely equal share of the popular votes,
the cumulative bias of the electoral system worked against the favorite
of most small states in 1960. Nixon would have needed a projected 50.3
percent of the major-party votes to carry an electoral majority, assuming
a constant percentage shift of major-party voters from Kennedy to Nixon
in each state. Kennedy would have won a minimum electoral majority
with ai projected 49.8 percent of the two-party votes.
Comparing the results of the 1960 and 1968 elections under an equal
division of the major-party votes, shows that Nixon's lead outside the
largest states increased considerably from ten more state victories than
8 According to the Survey Research Center data, the three-party 1968 presidential contest gave Humphrey 94 percent of the black vote, 85 percent of the
Jewish vote, and 54 percent of the Catholic vote. He carried 50 percent of the votes
in the cities ( population over 50,000) and was more popular in the larger cities.
9 Mississippi voters elected an unpledged slate that voted for Harry Byrd of
Virginia. The rest of the states supported major-party tickets. The District of Columbia possessed no electoral votes at the time of the 1960 election.
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the Democrats in 1960 to 19 more in 1968. This increase occurred at the
same time that two of the nine largest states swung from the Democratic
to the Republican column of state victories. These simultaneous Republican gains in state victories, with national popular support held constant,
raises the suspicion that Nixon's 36 vote advantage gained through carrying more of the "extra votes" in 1968 may not only be attributable to
greater popularity in small states, but also to a favorable distribution of
his support among these states for carrying state-wide majorities.
The small increment in the electoral strength of the small states
under the present system because of the non-popular aspects of apportionment does not measure the influence of the small state voters. The
casting of a state's electoral strength under the general ticket system is
controlled by a state-wide majority vote, and a very sizeable minority
in the state may be denied any influence on the casting of its electoral
votes. Moreover, even though they seem generally to have a net preference for Republicans, 10 the small states do not vote as a unified bloc,
and thus any advantage for the majority of such states is partially offset
by the minority. Consequently, the advantage to the small state voters
as a group in influencing the electoral college is small and appears easily
outweighed by other biases of the present electoral system.
The preceding analysis attempted to illustrate the impact for small
states and their voters of the present electoral apportionment and the
winner-take-all system of controlling a state's electors. However, there
is one aspect of the present constitutional system that may provide the
representatives of the small states more influence in selecting the President than their small constituencies alone would warrant. The President
is not necessarily chosen by the electoral college, in which most of the
electors are from the large states. An absolute majority of all the presidential electors apportioned to the states must support a candidate to
elect him President. One party has always controlled a majority of the
electoral votes since 1824, and as long as the two major parties control
almost all of the electors, the electoral college is likely to elect the
President. In the absence of an electoral maiority, however, the Constitution requires that the state delegations in the House of Representatives
elect the President from among the three leading candidates in the electoral votes. As each state delegation, large or small, would cast one
ballot, 26 states representing relatively few people could elect the President from among the three candidates nominated by the electoral col10 The Republicans usually carried most of the smaller third of the states in
the 26 presidential elections after the Civil War. The Democrats with the support
of the medium-sized states of the South usually carried most of the intermediate
third of the states throughout this period.
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lege. In theory, the smallest 26 states, containing only about 15 percent
of the nation's population, could out-vote the states representing the
oveiwhelming majority of Americans.
This small state bias was intended by the framers of the Constitution to allay fears that only candidates favored in the large states would
muster large blocs of electoral votes. As national coalitions were not
envisioned, it was presumed that the state-appointed electors would favor
home-state figures. The Constitution originally provided that the electors
would have to cast a second ballot for someone outside their home state.
Yet, unless there was some obvious choice, it would be difficult for the
electors voting in their separate state capitals to concentrate their second
presidential ballots. In compensation, the contingent election would give
the small state representatives an equal voice, with delegations from
populous states, in selecting the President from among the leading
choices of the electoral college. The original rationale for a contingent
election, providing for state equality, evaporated almost immediately
when national partisan coalitions united state majorities, irrespective
of state size, and facilitated the election of the President without resort
to the contingent election. Thus, there have been only two contingent
elections. The first occurred in 1801 when the House delegations were
obliged to choose between Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr because the
original electoral system was unable to distinguish between the partisan
votes for President and Vice President. To insure that a national party
coalition could control both the offices of President and Vice President
without further embarrassment, the Twelfth Amendment was passed
in 1803 to provide separate electoral college balloting for these two
offices.
The last contingent election occurred in 1825 after the dominant
Democratic Party had failed to agree on a national nominee in 1824
and four candidates with largely sectional bases of support divided the
electoral votes. Henry Clay, the Speaker of the House, helped organize
a coalition of state delegations behind John Q. Adams, who was elected
President over Andrew Jackson, the electoral vote leader. Jackson partisans, however, discredited the Adams administration with charges that
it had been spawned by a corrupt deal between Adams and Clay that
frustrated the will of the people. The legitimacy of any future administration undoubtedly would also suffer if it depended on a contingent
election.
In 1968 there was much concern that the third-party coalition led
by George Wallace might force a contingent election by winning a large
bloc of electoral votes in the South. Wallace slates actually captured five
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states, with 45 electoral votes, in the deep South. Unable to cany Texas
or sweep the South: however, Wallace's support was tool small to deny
both candidates electoral majorities, especially with Nixon's favorable
distribution of support for carrying electoral votes. Nevertheless, the
danger was real, and an electoral college deadlock could have precipitated
a severe political crisis. In 1968 thei Democrats won control of a majority
of the state delegations in the House of Representatives. Thus, Hubert
Humphrey would have been elected President in a contingent election
in 1969, if congressmen had voted strictly according to party affiliations.
According to that premise, Humphrey would have won 26 states, Nixon
19, and five state delegations would have divided evenly and cast no
ballot. However, a numb er of Representatives elected pledged to vote
for their constituents' favorites in the event of a contingent election. If
all the pledges had been honored and there were no other defections
from party regularity, Humphrey would have had the support of 24
state delegations, Nixon 22, with four split. 11 According to this premise,
no candidate would have had the absolute majority of state delegations
needed for election. Such a deadlock in the contingent election undoubtedly would have produced an electoral crisis. Congressmen would
have been placed under tremendous pressure, some of it not so savory,
to break the deadlock. Even some of the best motivated congressmen
might have been tom between voting for their party's nominee, their
constituents' preference, their state's preference, or the leading candidate
nationally. If any Southern Democrats had been willing to follow an
attempt by Wallace to bargain away control of the presidency, the
system would have been more thoroughly discredited.
The small states, thus, would have had a theoretical advantage in a
contingent election through the disproportionate weight of their representatives, the single representative from Nevada being as decisive as a
majority of the New York or California delegations. However, contingent
elections are rare and the contingent votes would be cast by representatives whose choice would be largely determined by partisan and other
considerations, distinct from the interests of small states as a group. Small
state voters, of course, would be divided between the national partisan
coalitions, and would hardly feel benefited as a group by the equality
of their state delegations with those of the populous states. The lack of
public confidence in such an election would extend even to those groups
presumably enjoying disproportional representation.
Some eminent students of politics have held that abolishing the two
electoral votes now apportioned each state regardless of population would
11 Lawrence Longley and Alan G. Braun, The Politics of Electoral College
Reform (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 17.
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violate an important compromise between the large and small states at
the Constitutional Convention of 1787. In the Senate debates over electoral reform in 1956, Senator John F. Kennedy argued that the states
joined the Union on the understanding that they would have the same
number of electoral votes as the number of Senators and Representatives.
Direct popular election, he suggested, would constitute a "breach of the
agreement made with the states when they came into the Union." 12
Interestingly, this "breach of contract" argument has not been applied
to the bias of contingent election. One reason for the failure to argue
for this aspect of the electoral system is that the national partisan coalitions have been able to avoid resort to contingent election since 1824.
Another reason is that a contingent election, as provided by the Constitution, would constitute so treacherous a proceeding that no one could
make a plausible case for it.
Nevertheless, now that contingent election of the President has
lain dormant since 1824, some defenders of the present system depict
the present electoral apportionment as conforming to the principle of the
federal system, which popular election would violate. However, although
based on representation in both houses of Congress, the electoral college
is not analogous to Congress in the way the states are represented. The
Congress is a coordinate body, and the branch in which the small states
share equality with the large states can block any act of the branch
basel on proportional representation. The electoral college would be
analogous to Congress voting as a single body. Although the small states
would have somewhat more representation than their population alone
would warrant, the small state congressmen would be overwhelmed by
the large state congressmen if representatives were to align according
to the size of ,their states. They invariably do not align this way, but that
only makes the small state bias inconsequential to small states as a group.
The philosophy that direct election would constitute a violation of
a fundamental agreement of the Union of the states ignores the probability that many compromises necessary in 1787 would fail to win the
acceptance of future generations. The drafters of the Constitution recognized this and provided for an amending process. The Constitution does
provide that no state can be deprived of its equal representation in the
Senate without its consent; all other aspects of the nation's representative system are now open to amendment. Actually, it was the equal
representation in the Senate that was seen as the crucial concession to
the small states, and the electoral apportionment was originally seen
12

Congressional Record, CII, Senate, March 20, 1956, p. 5150.
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as so favorable to the large states as to require equality of the states
voting in the contingent election.
Although there is a slight bias favoring the small states in the
electoral apportionment, it is easily overwhelmed by other biases in the
system. Indeed, from the perspective of campaign strategists, the populous states will usually seem to require the most attention in a presidential campaign despite the small state bias in apportionment. Of
course, campaign managers would prefer appeals that would win support
across the board and media that could' reach potential support throughout the nation. Few candidates lose because of poor distribution of
support, but many lose simply from insufficient popular strength, even
with favorable distribution. Nevertheless, campaign strategists must
sometimes make choices about where to concentrate scarce resources. A
party coalition would gain more electoral votes by carrying several small
states than by carrying one large state with the same population as the
combined small states. On the other hand, if a national ticket has competitive strength in all these states, then the chances of winning a popular
plurality in the one large state might seem greater than winning popular
pluralities simultaneously in the several small states. It might be rational,
therefore, to give disproportionate attention to winning a plurality in one
large state where a substantial bloc of votes is at stake, while expecting
to win popular pluralities in at least some of the smaller states, for
a net gain in electoral votes . If the large state voters were more closely
divided in their preferences than the voters in the small states, then a
presidential campaign would have even more incentive to seek the state's
entire bloc of votes, which would seem within its grasp.
Of course, a presidential ticket's appeals are limited by the nature
of its core voter support. It may seek to pick up strength beyond that
core, but not at the expense of alienating its basic constituency. Still, to
the extent that managers of a presidential campaign must choose states
in which to concentrate limited resources, they will probably select
states where they have a reasonable chance of winning large blocs of
electoral votes. The tendency to concentrate on the large states is reinforced by the great competitiveness of the major parties in most of the
very large states.
Under the present electoral system a presidential ticket must have
considerable popular strength in the largest states because the eleven
largest states alone contain an electoral majority. Therefore, a presi dential ticket must win at least some of these populous states to mobilize
an electoral majority. While, theoretically, a ticket need carry none of
the small or intermediate states, practically, a ticket must carry some of
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the small or intermediate states because any serious opposition will
almost certainly carry a number of the larger states. Given the present
distribution of the major-party voter coalitions, the Democrats probably
have to win most of the 17 large states to produce an electoral majority,
while the Republicans must carry at least some of them for an electoral
majority. At any rate, in a close election, a few large states with huge
blocs of electoral votes are likely to be carried by relatively small popular
vote pluralities. Thus, the large states are crucial in any closely contested
election, and they might receive attention even disproportional to their
large populations despite the theoretical small state bias of the present
system of apportionment. None of this demonstrates any advantage to
the large state voters as a group. On the other hand, there is no concrete
evidence that the slight small state bias in electoral apportionment
provides , any tangible advantage to small state voters.

